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ABSTRACT
Data corruption is an impediment to modern machine learning de-
ployments. Corrupted data can severely bias the learnedmodel and
can also lead to invalid inference. We present, Picket, a first-of-
its-kind system that enables data diagnostics for machine learning
pipelines over tabular data. Picket can safeguard against data cor-
ruptions that lead to degradation either during training or deploy-
ment. For the training stage, Picket identifies erroneous training
examples that can result in a biased model, while for the deploy-
ment stage, Picket flags corrupted query points to a trained ma-
chine learning model that due to noise will result to incorrect pre-
dictions. Picket is built around a novel self-supervised deep learn-
ing model for mixed-type tabular data. Learning this model is fully
unsupervised to minimize the burden of deployment, and Picket
is designed as a plugin that can increase the robustness of any
machine learning pipeline. We evaluate Picket on a diverse array
of real-world data considering different corruption models that in-
clude systematic and adversarial noise. We show that Picket offers
consistently accurate diagnostics during both training and deploy-
ment of various models ranging from SVMs to neural networks,
beating competing methods of data quality validation in machine
learning pipelines.
1 INTRODUCTION
Data quality assessment is critical in all phases of the machine
learning (ML) life cycle. Both in the training and deployment (infer-
ence) stages of MLmodels, erroneous data can have devastating ef-
fects. In the training stage, errors in the data can lead to biased ML
models [3, 7, 30, 47], i.e., models that learn wrong decision bound-
aries. In the deployment stage, errors in the inference queries can
result in wrong predictions, which in turn can be harmful for crit-
ical decision making systems [7, 50]. ML pipelines need reliable
data quality assessment throughout training and inference to be
robust to data errors.
This work focuses on designing a data diagnostics system for
ML pipelines over tabular data. The role of data diagnostics in ML
pipelines is to identify and filter data that lead to degradation either
during training or deployment. For the training stage, the goal of
data diagnostics is to identify erroneous training examples that if
used for learning will lead to a biased model, while for the deploy-
ment stage, the goal is to flag erroneous query points to a trained
ML model, i.e., points that due to noise will result in incorrect pre-
dictions. This work introduces a unified data diagnostics solution
for both the training and deployment stages of the ML life cycle.
Data diagnostics for ML exhibit several unique challenges re-
lated to data quality. In the training stage, data corruption should
not be considered in isolation but always in the context of learning.
During learning, low-magnitude noise in the data can be benefi-
cial and act as implicit regularization [5]. Such errors may lead to
improved generalization and should not be removed from a train-
ing set. On the other hand, not all data points with low-magnitude
noise are benevolent. Adversarial data poisoning techniques [4, 30,
39, 50] typically corrupt the training set using data points with
small perturbations. Similarly, in deployment, not all corruptions
will flip the prediction of a trained ML model. Different MLmodels
exhibit different degrees of robustness to random corruption, and
systematic or adversarial noise may be targeting specific subsets of
the data or classes in the ML pipeline [30]. Detection of inference
inputs that will result in a model misprediction due to corruption
requires not only knowledge of the data quality, but also knowl-
edge of how the corruption connects to the decision of the model.
The above challenges require rethinking the current solutions
for identifying errors in data. Existing error detection methods [17,
23, 37] aim to remove all errors from a data set, thus, they might
result in sub-optimal ML models by removing more points than
those necessary. Outlier detection methods either require access
to labeled data [55], a tedious task that hinders the deployment for
data diagnostics for diverse models and pipelines, or impose strong
assumptions on the distribution (e.g. Gaussian) of the data [13,
17]. Moreover, standard outlier detection methods are not effec-
tive against adversarial corruptions [30] since these corruptions
typically rely on low-magnitude perturbations and introduce erro-
neous points that are close to clean data. More advanced methods
are required to defend against adversarial corruptions [50]. Never-
theless, current methods are typically limited to real-valued data
and focus either on training or inference but not both. Finally, re-
cent techniques for data validation in ML pipelines [7, 47] rely on
user-specified rule- or schema-based quality assertions evaluated
over batches of data and it is unclear if they can support on-the-fly,
single point validation, which is required during inference.
We present Picket, a data diagnostics framework for both the
training and deployment stages ofML pipelines. Picket provides an
offline diagnostics service for data that come in batches at training
time and an online diagnostics service for data that come on the
fly at inference time. Effectively, Picket acts as a safeguard against
data corruptions that lead either to learning a biased model or an
erroneous prediction. Picket introduces a new deep learningmodel,
referred to as PicketNet, to learn the characteristics and the dis-
tribution of the data on which the ML pipeline operates. Picket-
Net models the distribution of mixed-type tabular data and is used
in Picket to distinguish between clean data points and corrupted
ones. We learn PicketNet without imposing any labeling burden to
the user by using the paradigm of self-supervision, a form of unsu-
pervised learning where the data provide the supervision. The de-
sign of Picket borrows from our prior extensive experience on ML-
based solutions for autonomous data quality management [23, 53],
however, there are many practical aspects of automating data diag-
nostics in ML pipelines that have not been previously considered.
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We have distilled three principles that have shaped Picket âĂŹs
design:
1. Bring All Data Types to Bear: The system should support
mixed-type data ranging from numerical and categorical values
to textual descriptions. It needs to properly represent and process
different data types and capture the dependencies between them.
2. Robustness to Noise: Learning within the system should be
robust to noisy values. We want to avoid supervision and the in-
puts to Picket will not be clean. Further, the detection of problem-
atic samples should depend not only on the input data but also the
downstream decision system and take into account its robustness.
3. Plugin to an ML pipeline: The system should serve as a “plu-
gin” to any ML pipeline. It needs to be unsupervised to minimize
the burden of deployment; it should learn to distinguish corrupted
data that lead to degradation from other data points in a fully unsu-
pervised way. The system also needs to be model-agnostic, i.e., it
should not impose any strict requirements or assumptions on the
model in the ML pipeline or make any modification to it.
Our work makes the following technical contributions:
Self-Attention for Tabular Data We propose a novel deep learn-
ing model for mixed-type tabular data. As discussed later, data di-
agnostics are designed as services over this model. The architec-
ture of PicketNet corresponds to a new version of a multi-head
self-attention module [52], a core-component in state-of-the-art
machine learning models in natural language processing. The new
model builds upon our recent ideas [53] which demonstrate that
Attention is key to learning schema-level dependencies in tabular
data. However, PicketNet introduces a novel stream-based (schema
stream and value stream) architecture that is able to capture not
only the dependencies between attributes at the schema-level but
also the statistical relations between cell values. We find that com-
pared to schema-only models, our novel two-stream architecture is
critical for obtaining accurate predictions across diverse data sets.
Robust Training over Arbitrary Corruptions To use unsuper-
vised learning, we need a training procedure that is robust to noisy
inputs. We propose a self-supervised training procedure that is ro-
bust to noisy inputs. The procedure monitors the loss of tuples in
the input data over early training iterations and uses related sta-
tistics to identify suspicious data points. These points are then ex-
cluded from subsequent iterations during training. We show that
this procedure allows Picket to be robust to even adversarial noise.
Diagnostic Services for ML Pipelines Picket introduces a new
architecture where data diagnostics for ML pipelines correspond
to services over a pre-trained PicketNet. We show how to use the
reconstruction loss of the pre-trained model as the basis of data di-
agnostic services for both the training and the test stages of super-
visedML pipelines, viewing the downstreammodels as black boxes.
We also demonstrate that Picket’s diagnostic services generalize to
and can benefit ML pipelines with different models ranging from
support vector machines to neural networks. We conduct exten-
sive experiments to evaluate the performance of Picket-diagnostics
against a variety of baseline methods both for training time and
inference time. These baselines include state-of-the-art outlier de-
tection methods built upon unsupervised autoencodermodels [17]
and defences to adversarial corruptionattacks [21, 45]. For training
time detection of corrupted data, Picket outperforms all competing
methods, with an average improvement of ∼ 14 area under the re-
ceiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) points, while it con-
sistently achieves an AUROC of above 80 points—an AUROC score
of above 80 points is considered as excellent discrimination [24].
For test time victim sample detection, Picket has the highest qual-
ity in most cases with improvements of at least 2-5 F1 points.
2 BACKGROUND
We review basic background material for the problems and tech-
niques discussed in this paper.
2.1 Data Quality in ML Pipelines
We first discuss different types of data corruption models that are
considered in the literature. Then, we review existing approaches
to deal with data corruptions, both during training and inference,
that are related to the problems we consider in this paper.
Data Corruption Models We consider data corruptions due to
random, systematic, and adversarial noise.
1. Random noise is drawn from some unknown distribution that
does not depend on the data. Random noise is not predictable and
cannot be replicated by doing the same experiment.
2. Systematicnoise exhibits structure and typically leads to errors
that appear repeatedly in a subset of data samples. This type of
noise introduces bias to the data. Systematic noise is predictable
and replicable since it depends on the data or external factors in
a deterministic way. For example, systematic corruptions may be
introduced after joining a clean and a noise data set to obtain the
final training data set for a ML model.
3.Adversarial noise contaminates the data tomisleadMLmodels.
At training time, adversarial noise forces a model to learn a bad
decision boundary; at test time, adversarial noise fools a model so
that it makes the wrong prediction. It usually depends on the data
and the target model, although some types of adversarial noise may
work well across different models.
Corruptions due to random or systematic noise do not directly
lead to degradation of theMLmodel unless themajority of the data
is corrupted. In fact, many ML models are shown to be robust to
these types of noise [31]. On the other hand, corruptions due to
adversarial noise are designed to be harmful to ML systems and
raises security concerns. Picket is able to handle all three types of
noise and the corresponding data corruptions.
Dealing with Corrupted Data in ML The most common ap-
proach to deal with corrupted data during training is to identify
samples that have missing values or have erroneous feature-values
or labels and remove them from the training set. We refer to this
process as filtering. Given a training data setD, the goal of filtering
is to identify a feasible set of data pointsC ⊆ D to be used for train-
ing. Data setC may still contain noisy data but should not contain
corrupted points that introduce bias. Different mechanisms have
been proposed for filtering: 1) Learning-based outlier detection
methods [9, 17, 32] leverage ML or statistical models to learn the
distribution of clean data and detect out-of-distribution samples
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(including adversarially corrupted samples); 2) Error-detectionmeth-
ods [23, 37, 43] rely on a combination of logic-rule and ML mod-
els to identify corrupted samples; they do not consider adversar-
ial corruptions. For corruptions that correspond to missing val-
ues alone, recent works propose imputing the missing values [53]
before training a ML model [27] or performing statistical estima-
tion [33]. Finally, recent data validationmodules forMLplatforms [3,
7, 47] rely on user-defined quality rules andmeasures aswell as and
simple one-column statistics to check the quality of data batches.
Such user-defined quality rules are out of the scope of this work. In
this work, we consider corruptions that correspond to erroneous
values due to random, systematic, or adversarial noise. We focus
on filtering corrupted samples from the training data that lead to
model degradation.
The above approaches, predominantly outlier detection, can also
be used during inference. In addition,more advancedmethods have
been proposed to guard against adversarial corruption at inference
time. These methods accept or reject a data point either via sta-
tistical tests that compare inference queries to clean data [21] or
by considering variations in a model’s internal data representation
(e.g., the neuron activations of a neural network or the prediction
confidence of the downstream model) [45]. Similar to these works,
we also consider the online detection of inference queries that will
result in wrong model predictions due to corruption.
2.2 Self-Supervision and Self-Attention
We review relevant ML concepts.
Self-Supervision In self-supervised learning systems, the learn-
ing objective is to predict part of the input from the rest of it. A typ-
ical approach to self-supervision is to mask a portion of the input,
and let the model reconstruct the masked portion based on the un-
masked parts. By self-supervision, a model learns to capture depen-
dencies between different parts of the data. Self-supervised learn-
ing has shown great success in natural language processing [12,
51]. Self-supervised learning is a subset of unsupervised learning
in a broad sense, since it does not require any human supervision.
Multi-Head Self-Attention Multi-head self-attention is a model
for learning a representation of a structured inputs e.g., a tuple
or a text sequence, by capturing the dependencies between differ-
ent parts of the input [52]. One part can pay different levels of
attention to other parts of the same structured input. For example,
consider the text sequence “the dog wears a white hat”, the token
“wears” pays more attention to “hat” than “white” although “white”
is closer in the sequence. The attention mechanism can also be ap-
plied to tuples that consist of different attributes [53]. Multi-head
self-attention takes an ensemble of different attention functions,
with each head learning one.
We review the computations in multi-head self-attention. Let
x1, x2, . . . ,xT be the embedding of a structured input with T to-
kens. Each token xi is transformed to a query-key-value triplet
(qi = WQxi , ki = WKxi , vi = WV xi ) by three learnable matrices
WQ ,WK andWV . The queryqi , key ki , and valuevi are real-valued
vectors with the same dimension d . The output of a single head for
the ith token is
∑T
j=1wi jvj , a weighted sum of all the values in
the sequence, where wi j = softmax((qTi k1,qTi k2, . . . ,qTi kT )/
√
d)j .
The attention xi pays to xj is determined by the inner product of
qi and kj . Multiple heads share the same mechanism but have dif-
ferent transformation matrices. In the end, the outputs of all the
heads are concatenated and transformed into the final output by
an output matrixWO , which is also learnable.
3 FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
We formalize the problem of data diagnostics for ML pipelines and
provide an overview of our solution to this problem.
3.1 Problem Statement
We use D to denote a set of tabular data, and x to denote a single
sample (tuple) in D withT attributes. These attributes correspond
to features and can also contain the correct label for the data sam-
ple (optionally). We consider a downstream decision system with
a classifier f . For a sample x , let the prediction of the classifier be
f (x), and the correct label of x be y. For each x we denote x∗ its
clean version; if x is not corrupted then x = x∗ .
Training Time Diagnostics Before the training of classifier f , a
training set D containing N tuples is collected. We assume that
D contains clean and corrupted samples and that the fraction of
corrupted samples is always less than half. We term training time
diagnostics the task of filtering out the corrupted samples inD that
bias the learning process. This task is different from that of error
detection: we do not wish to remove all erroneous samples from
D but only those that harm the learning process. We formalize the
task of training time diagnostics next. We denote X the domain of
the samples in D. Let s : X → R be a score function that takes in a
data point x and returns a number representing how corrupted the
data point is. We define the feasible set Cs of D with respect to a
score function s to be Cs = {x : x ∈ X with s(x) < τ }. We assume
that the threshold τ is chosen such that a desired fraction of points
from the set D is discarded (e.g., the user may choose to discard at
most 5% of the points in D). The goal of training time diagnostics
is to find a score function s such that training over Cs minimizes
the generalization error of a model f .
Inference TimeDiagnostics We consider a trained model f that
is deployed and serves incoming inference queries. Each inference
query is accompanied by a data sample x . We define a victim sam-
ple to be a sample x such that f (x∗) = y but f (x) , y, i.e., it should
have been correctly classified without the corruption. We term in-
ference time diagnostics the problem: Given a classifier f that is
trained on clean data, for each sample x that comes on the fly, we
want to tell if it is a good sample that can be correctly classified or
it is a victim sample, i.e., we want to detect if f (x) , f (x∗).
We next describe how Picket solves the aforementioned tasks.
3.2 Picket Overview
We provide an overview of Picket and how it provides data diag-
nostics services for ML. An overview is shown in Figure 1.
Training Time Diagnostics For this phase, the input to Picket
is a training data set D and a threshold τ that corresponds to an
upper bound on the fraction of points to be filtered from D. The
output of Picket is a feasible set Cs ⊆ D of data points to be used
for training a downstream model. Recall, that Cs is determined by
a score function s that measures the corruption of points inD. This
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Figure 1: The key components of a typical machine learning pipeline with Picket.
function should be such that the generalization error of the down-
stream classifier is minimized. We do not want to tie training time
diagnostics to a specific ML model, hence, we approximate gener-
alization error via the reconstruction loss of Picket’s model Picket-
Net (see Section 5). This design choice is motivated by results in the
ML literature which show that unsupervised pre-training is linked
to better generalization performance [12, 18, 57].
Picket follows the next steps to identify the score function s :
First, Picket learns a self-supervised PicketNet model M that cap-
tures howdata features are distributed for the clean samples. Picket
uses a novel unsupervised robust training mechanism to learn M ,
i.e., the system does not have access to training samples that are
labeled as clean or corrupted. In this phase, we ignore any attribute
in D that corresponds to the labels of the samples. We assume that
labels are either clean or label-based noise is naturally handled by
the downstream training procedure.During training, Picket records
the reconstruction loss across training epochs for all points in D.
After training of M , the reconstruction loss trajectories for the
points inD are analyzed to form a score function s for training time
diagnostics. Finally, the feasible setCs is identified and returned to
proceed with training of the downstream supervised model.
Inference Time Diagnostics We assume a trained classifier f
serving inference queries. Picket’s inference time diagnostics ser-
vice spans two phases, offline and online. For the offline phase, we
assume access to a set of clean training samples C . We consider
that inference samples follow the same distribution as those in
C before corruption. We follow the next steps during the offline
phase: first, data set C is used to learn a PicketNet M ; second, C
is augmented by adding artificial noise and then extended with re-
construction loss features from M , and this new data set, denoted
A, is used to learn a setG of victim sample detectors (one for each
class considered during inference). These detectors corresponds to
0-1 classifiers. Note that we can take Cs as the clean set, and M
as the pre-trained PicketNet from the training time diagnostics if
the diagnostics of the two stages are combined. Models M and G
are used during the online phase. During this phase, we assume a
stream S of incoming inference queries. S is served by the down-
stream prediction service corresponding to classifier f to provide
predictions. To provide online inference time diagnostics, Picket
performs the following: for each point x ∈ S it evaluates classifier
f on x to obtain an initial prediction f (x). Picket also uses M to
compute a feature vector of reconstruction losses for the features
of x . This reconstruction loss feature-vector together with the raw
features in x are given as input to the victim sample detector for
the class that corresponds to f (x). Using this input, the detector
identifies if point x corresponds to a victim sample; if the point is
not marked as suspicious the final prediction is revealed.
4 THE PICKETNET MODEL
We introduce PicketNet, a two-stream self-attentionmodel to learn
the distribution of tabular data. The term stream refers to a path
in a deep neural network that focuses on a specific view of the in-
put data. For example, a standard multi-head attention path is one
stream that learns value-based dependencies between the parts of
the input data (see Section 2). Recent deep learning architectures
have proposed combining multiple streams, where each stream
focuses on learning a different view of the data. Such architec-
tures achieve state-of-the-art results in natural language process-
ing tasks [57] and computer vision tasks [48]. PicketNet introduces
a novel two-stream self-attention model for tabular data. We next
describe the PicketNet architecture and then the robust, self-supervised
training process we follow.
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4.1 Model Architecture
PicketNet contains a schema stream and a value stream. The schema
stream captures schema-level dependencies between attributes of
the data, while the value stream captures dependencies between
specific data values. A design overview of PicketNet is shown in
Figure 2. The input to the network is amixed-type data tuplex with
T attributes. We denote its attribute values as x1, x2, . . . ,xT . We
discuss the different components of PicketNet architecture next.
The first step is to obtain a numerical representation of tuple x .
To capture the schema- and value-level information for x , we con-
sider two numerical representations for each attribute i : 1) a real-
valued vector that encodes the information in value xi , denoted by
I
(0)
i , and 2) a real-valued vector that encodes schema-level informa-
tion of attribute i , denoted by P (0)i . For example, a tuple with two
attributes is represented as I (0)1 P
(0)
1 I
(0)
2 P
(0)
2 .
To convert xi to I
(0)
i , PicketNet uses the following process: The
encoding for each attribute value xi is computed independently.
We consider 1) categorical, 2) numerical, and 3) textual attributes.
For categorical attributes, we use a learnable lookup table to get
the embedding for each value in the domain. This lookup table is
learned jointly with the subsequent components of PicketNet. For
numerical attributes, we keep the raw value. For text attributes, we
train a fastText [6] model over the corpus of all the texts and apply
SIF [2] to aggregate the embedding of all the words in a cell. The
initial embedding vectors I (0)i are fed as input to the value-level
stream. Each attribute follows a different embedding process.
Each vector P (0)i serves as a positional encoding of the attribute
associated with index i . Positional encodings are used to capture
high-level dependencies between attributes. For example, if there
exists a strong dependency between two attributes i and j, vectors
P
(0)
i and P
(0)
j should be such that the attention score between i
and j is high. Each P (0)i corresponds to a trainable vector that is
initialized randomly and is fed as input to the schema stream.
We now describe subsequent layers of our model. These lay-
ers consider the two attention streams and form a stack of n self-
attention layers. The output of the previous layer serves as the
input to the next layer. Self-attention layer l takes the value vec-
tor I (l )i and positional encoding P
(l )
i to learn a further represen-
tation for attribute i and its value xi . After each attention layer,
the outputs of the two streams are aggregated and fed as input to
the value-level stream of the next layer, while the schema stream
still takes as input the positional encoding. The output of the value
stream H (l )i and that of the schema stream G
(l )
i are computed as:
H
(l )
i = MHS(Q = L(I
(l )
i ),K = L(I
(l )
j=1, ...,T ),V = L(I
(l )
j=1, ...,T ))
G
(l )
i = MHS(Q = L(P
(l )
i ),K = L(P
(l )
j=1, ...,T ),V = L(I
(l )
j=1, ...,T ))
where MHS is the multi-head attention function followed by a
feed-forward network, and L is a linear transformation that trans-
forms the input into query, key, or value vectors by the correspond-
ing matrices. Q,K ,V are matrices with query, key and value vec-
tors from multiple attributes packed together. The only difference
between the two streams is that the query in the schema stream
corresponds to the positional encoding, therefore it learns higher-
level dependencies. For the value stream the input to the next level
is the sum of the outputs from the two streams: I (l+1)i = H
(l )
i +G
(l )
i ,
while for the schema stream the input to the next level P (l+1)i cor-
responds to a new positional encoding that does not depend on the
previous layers. If layer l is the last layer, Oi = I
(l+1)
i is the final
representation for attribute value xi of the input data.
4.2 Training Process
We now describe how PicketNet is trained.
Multi-Task Self-Supervised Training The training process is
self-supervised, with an objective of reconstructing the input. In
each iteration, wemask one of the attributes, and try to reconstruct
it based on the context, i.e., the other attributes in the same tuple.
The attributes aremasked in turn, with a specified or random order.
The training is also multi-task since the reconstruction of each
attribute forms one task. We use different types of losses for the
three types of attributes to quantify the quality of reconstruction.
Consider a sample x whose original value of attribute i is xi . If
xi is numerical, its a one-dimensional value, and hence, the recon-
struction of the input value is a regression task: We apply a simple
neural network on the outputOi to get an one-dimensional recon-
struction xˆi , and use the mean squared error (MSE) loss:
MSE(xi , xˆi ) = (xi − xˆi )2
For categorical or textual attributes we use the following loss. Con-
sider a tuple x and its attribute i . For its attribute value xi let
I 0i (xi ) be the input embedding obtained from PicketNet, andOi (xi )
the contextual encoding of value xi after pushing tuple x through
PicketNet. Given tuple x , we randomly select a set of other values
Zi from the domain of attribute i . We mask the value of attribute i
and consider the training loss associated with identifying xi as the
correct completion value from the set of possible values {xi } ∪ Zi .
To compute the training loss we use the cosine similarity between
Oi (xi ) and the input encoding I 0i (r ) for each r ∈ {xi }∪Zi , then we
apply the softmax function over the similarities and calculate the
cross-entropy (CE) loss:
CE(x,Zi ; i,M) = − log(
exp(sim(I (0)i (xi ),Oi (xi )))
∑
r ∈{xi }∪Zi exp(sim(I
(0)
i (r ),Oi (xi )))
)
where sim(a,b) is the cosine similarity between a and b .
Loss-based Filtering The input to PicketNet may not be clean,
and self-supervised models are vulnerable to noisy training data
since the features and labels are both corrupted in the presence
of noise. Therefore, we need a mechanism to make the training
process robust to noisy input. We introduce a loss-based filtering
mechanism to our system. Similar mechanisms have been explored
in the context of image processing [49, 56].
In the early stages of training, we record the statistics of recon-
struction loss for several epochs. We aggregate the losses of all the
attributes over the recorded epochs, and filter out the samples with
abnormally high or low loss. The detailed steps are as follows:
(1) Train PicketNet over the training set D for E1 epochs to
warm up.
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Figure 2: (a) Overview of the two-stream multi-head self-attention network. (b) An illustration of the schema stream for the
first attribute.(c) An illustration of the value stream for the first attribute.
(2) Train PicketNet over D for E2 epochs and, for each sample
in x ∈ D, record the epoch-wise average loss Lossi (x) for
each attribute i , i = 1, 2, . . . ,T .
(3) For each sample, aggregate the losses attribute-wise:
Loss(x ) =
T∑
i=1
Lossi (x )/MedianD (Lossi (·)) (1)
where MedianD computes the median over all points in D.
(4) Put a sample into setD′ if its aggregated loss is less thanδlow
or greater than δhigh, where δlow and δhigh are pre-specified
thresholds. D′ is the set of samples to be removed.
(5) Train PicketNet over D \ D′ until convergence.
When we do the attribute-wise aggregation, we perform nor-
malization by dividing the loss of each attribute by the median of
it to bring different types of losses to the same scale. The normal-
ized loss characterizes how large the loss is relative to the average
level loss in that attribute. Note that we use the median instead
of mean because the median is more robust to noise. In the cases
when some samples have extremely high or low loss, the mean
could shift a lot while the median is more stable.
The filtering is two-sided because randomly or systematically
corrupted samples and adversarially poisoned samples have differ-
ent behaviors during the early training stage. Outlierswith random
or systematic noise are internally inconsistent and thus have high
reconstruction loss in the early training stage of PicketNet. How-
ever, adversarially poisoned samples tend to have unusually low
reconstruction loss. The reason is that poisoned data tend to be
concentrated on a few locations to be effective and appear normal,
as is pointed out by Koh et al. [30]. Such concentration forces deep
Figure 3: The reconstruction loss distributions of clean sam-
ples, randomly corrupted samples, systematically corrupted
samples and poisoned samples in the early training stage.
networks such as PicketNet to fit very quickly and therefore the re-
construction loss in the early stage is lower than that of the clean
samples. We confirm this hypothesis experimentally. In Figure 3,
we show the distributions of the reconstruction loss for 1) clean
samples, 2) randomly and systematically corrupted samples, and
3) adversarially poisoned samples for a real-world dataset. We can
see that the loss distributions of the three types of samples have
notable statistical distances. Therefore, we need to filter out the
samples with high loss to remove randomly or systematically cor-
rupted samples, and samples with abnormally low loss to defend
against poisoning attacks.
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5 DATA DIAGNOSTICS FOR ML IN PICKET
The key element that enables both training time and inference time
diagnostics is the reconstruction loss of PicketNet, which provides
a signal that indicates how inconsistent an attribute value is with
respect to the other attribute values in a tuple. The internal incon-
sistency can be used to diagnose the data.
Filtering Corrupted Training Data We use PicketNet’s recon-
struction loss statistics (see Equation 1) from training to design the
score function s that is used to identify the feasible setCs (see Sec-
tion 3.2). The score function follows immediately from the robust
training procedure for PicketNet described in Section 4.2. We set
the aggregated reconstruction loss statistics for each point in D
(see Equation 1) to be the score function s for filtering corrupted
points. We then define the feasible set Cs to be Cs = {x : x ∈
D with Loss(x) < τlow or Loss(x) > τhigh}. We allow for two differ-
ent thresholds to distinguish between points with random or sys-
tematic corruption, and points with adversarial corruptions (see
Section 4.2). The user can choose to use the default thresholds δlow
and δhigh used when training PicketNet—this option corresponds
to the robust training mechanism of PicketNet—or can adjust the
thresholds to be more or less conservative (see Section 6.2).
Victim Sample Detection for Inference Data We combine the
reconstruction lossmeasurements fromPicketNet with victim sam-
ple detectors to obtain Picket’s inference time diagnostics (see Sec-
tion 3.2) for a trained classifier f . For each class y in the down-
stream classification task, we build a detector дy to identify victim
sample, i.e., samples for which f will provide a wrong prediction
due to corruption of the feature values. Picket uses logistic regres-
sion as the detector model by default but the user can easily switch
to other classifiers. The training of these classifiers is performed
using synthetically generated training data.
During the offline phase of inference time diagnostics, we as-
sume access to a set of clean training data points C . Notice that
C may be the same as Cs obtained via applying Picket’s training
time diagnostics on a potentially corrupted data set D. We first ap-
ply classifier f on all points in C and obtain a subset of points for
which f returns the correct prediction, i.e., f (x) = y. We denote
this subsetCcor. Moreover, we partitionCcor into setsC
y
cor, one for
each classy of the downstream prediction class. For each partition,
we use the points inC
y
cor to construct artificial victim samples and
artificial noisy points for which f returns the correct prediction
despite the injection of noise. Let VSy and NS
y
cor be the set of ar-
tificial victim samples and the set of noisy but correctly classified
sample generated from C
y
cor respectively. To construct these two
data sets we select a random point x∗ from Cycor and inject artifi-
cial noise to obtain a noisy version x ; we then evaluate f (x) and if
f (x) = f (x∗) = y we assign the generated point x to NSycor other-
wise we assign it toVSy . We iteratively perform the above process
for randomly selected points inC
y
cor until we populate setsVS
y and
NS
y
cor with enough points such that |Cycor | = |NSycor | = 0.5× |VSy |.
Given these three sets, we construct a new augmented data set
Ay = C
y
cor ∪ NSycor ∪ VSy . We extend the feature vector for each
point in x ∈ Ay by concatenating it with the reconstruction loss
vector obtained after passing each point through the trained Picket-
NetM . We also assign to it a positive label (indicative that we will
obtain a correct prediction) if it originated fromC
y
cor or NS
y
cor and
a negative label (indicating that we will obtain a wrong prediction)
if it originated fromVSy . The output of this procedure is the train-
ing data for the victim sample detector дy . We repeat the above
process for each class y.
Ideally, in the above process, the artificial noise that we inject
should have the same distribution as that in the real-world case.
However, it is impossible to know the exact noise distribution in
advance. In practice, we add random noise to train the detectors
and they work well in the presence of other types of noise. A pos-
sible reason is that the detectors learn an approximate boundary
between good and victim samples regardless of noise type.
At inference time, the victim sample detectors are deployed along
with the downstreammodel.Whenever a samplex comes, the down-
stream model gives the prediction f (x) and PicketNet gives the re-
construction losses. The corresponding detector дf (x ) decides if it
should be marked as suspicious based on x itself and the recon-
struction loss vector. Note that since the reconstruction loss of
categorical and textual attributes depends on the set of negative
samples that are randomly selected from the domain of the corre-
sponding attribute, we repeat the loss computation several times
and take the mean to reduce the effect of randomness.
6 EXPERIMENTS
We compare the performance of Picket against baseline methods
on detecting corrupted points (i.e., outlier detection) at training
time and the victim sample detection task at test time on a variety
of datasets. We seek to validate the effectiveness of Picket’s data
diagnostics on safeguarding against different types of corruption
in ML pipelines. We consider both training and deployment of dif-
ferent ML models. Finally, we perform several micro-benchmarks
to validate different design choices in Picket.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We introduce the datasets, noise generation process, downstream
models, baselines, and metrics used in our evaluation. We also pro-
vide the hyper-parameters we use for PicketNet.
Datasets: We consider six data sets, which are summarized in
Table 1. The first five data sets, Wine [10], Adult [15], Market-
ing [31], Restaurant [11], Titanic [16] correspond to binary clas-
sification data sets from different domains. They cover numerical,
categorical, and textual attributes and contain either one type of
attributes or a mixture of different types. These data sets where
obtained from the UCI repository [15] and the CleanML bench-
mark [31]. The last data set we consider, HTRU2 [34], is purely
numerical and we use it in the context of adversarial noise. It also
focuses on classification. The reason is that common adversarial
attack methods only apply to numerical and not categorical data.
A detailed description of the data sets is as follows.
• Wine:The data set consists of statistics about different types
of wine based on physicochemical tests. The task is to pre-
dict if the quality of a type of wine is beyond average or not.
The features are purely numerical.
• Adult: The data set contains a set of US Census records of
adults. The task is to predict if a person makes over $50,000
per year. The features are a mixture of categorical and nu-
merical attributes.
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Table 1: Properties of the datasets in our experiments.
Dataset Size
Numerical
Attributes
Categorical
Attributes
Textual
Attributes
Wine 4898 11 0 0
Adult 32561 5 9 0
Marketing 8993 0 13 0
Restaurant 12007 0 3 7
Titanic 891 2 5 3
HTRU2 17898 8 0 0
• Marketing:The data set comes from a survey on household
income consisting of several demographic features. The task
is to predict whether the annual gross income of a house-
hold is less than $25,000. The features are purely categori-
cal.
• Restaurant: The data set contains information of restau-
rants from Yelp. The task is to predict if the price range of
a restaurant is “one dollar sign” on Yelp. The features are a
mixture of categorical values and textual description,
• Titanic: The data set contains personal and ticket informa-
tion of passengers. The task is to predict if a passenger sur-
vives or not. The features are a mixture of numerical, cate-
gorical and textual attributes.
• HTRU2: The dataset contains statistics about a set of pul-
sar candidates collected in a universe survey. The task is to
predict if a candidate is a real pulsar or not. The features are
purely numeric.
We consider downstream ML pipelines over these data sets that
use 80% of each data set as the training set, and the rest as test
data. To reduce the effect of class imbalance, we undersample the
unbalanced datasets where over 70% of the samples belong to one
class. The numerical attributes are normalized to zero mean and
unit variance before noise injection.
Noise Generation Process We consider different types of noise.
For random and systematic noise, we corrupt β fraction of the cells
in the noisy samples. For adversarial noise, we use data poisoning
techniques at training, and evasion attack methods at inference:
• Random Noise: For a categorical or textual attribute, the
value of a corrupted cell is flipped to another value in the
domain of that attribute. For a numerical attribute, we add
Gaussian noise to the value of a corrupted cell, with zero
mean and standard deviation of σ1, where σ1 is a constant.
• SystematicNoise: For categorical and textual data, we ran-
domly generate a predefined functionwhich maps the value
of a corrupted cell to another value in the same domain.
The mapping function depends on both the value in that at-
tribute and the value in another pre-specified attribute. For
a numerical attribute, we add a fixed amount of noise σ2 to
the value of a corrupted cell, where σ2 is a constant.
• Adversarial Noise: In the training time, the adversarial
samples are generated by a back-gradient method [39]. This
type of noise is specific to different downstreammodels, and
thus, different for each data-model combination. In the in-
ference time, we use the projected gradient descent (PGD)
attack [35], a white-box evasion attack method to generate
adversarial test samples.We use the implementation of PGD
attack from [40]. The corruption injected by the PGD attack
is bounded by an infinity norm of 0.2.
The default noise parameters are set to β = 0.5, σ1 = 5, σ2 = 1 at
training time and β = 0.25, σ1 = 5, σ2 = 1 at inference time.
DownstreamModels We consider the next downstream models:
• Logistic regression (LR) with regularization parameter 1.
• A Support Vector Machine (SVM) with a linear kernel and
regularization parameter 1.
• A fully-connected neural network (NN) with 2 hidden layers
of size 100. We use a small model with 1 hidden layer of size
10 when we perform poisoning attacks due to the runtime
complexity of the attack algorithm.
Baselines We consider different baselines at training and infer-
ence time as the tasks are different. We compare against three un-
supervised outlier detection methods for training time diagnostics:
• Isolation Forest (IF) Isolation Forest [32] is similar to Ran-
dom Forest but targeting outlier detection. The method ran-
domly selects split points for each tree, and uses the average
path length to the root as the measure of normality.
• One-Class SVM (OCSVM) OCSVM [9] is similar to SVM
but only learn the boundary of normal data. It detects out-
liers based on the learned boundary. We use an OCSVM
model with a radial basis function kernel.
• Robust Variational Autoencoder (RVAE): RVAE [17] is
a state-of-the-art generative model learning the joint distri-
bution of the clean data. It explicitly assigns a probability of
being an outlier for each cell, and aggregates all the probabil-
ity of the cells in each sample to detect anomalous samples.
IF and OCSVM require the estimated proportion of outliers in the
training set as a hyper-parameter, and we provide the actual pro-
portion. For RVAE, we use the hyper-parameters from [17].
At test time, we compare against: 1) methods based on per class
binary classifiers, 2) naïve confidence-based methods, and 3) adver-
sarial example detection methods from adversarial learning.
Methods based on per class binary classifiers follow the same
strategy as Picket but use different features.
• Raw Feature (RF) The binary classifiers only have access
to the raw features of the data.
• RVAE The binary classifiers use the cell-level probability of
being outliers provided by RVAE as features.
• RVAE+ The classifiers use a combination of the features
from the two methods above.
We consider the following naïve methods:
• Calibrated Confidence Score (CCS) CCS assumes that
the victim samples have lower confidence scores than the
clean samples being correctly classified. It considers low con-
fidence samples as victim samples. The confidence scores
are provided by the downstream models and calibrated by
temperature scaling [22].
• k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) KNN assumes that a victim
sample tends to have a different prediction from its neigh-
bors. KNN sets samples with high fraction of disagreement
as victim samples. Fraction of disagreement is the fraction of
thek nearest neighbors that has different predictions. When
Picket: Self-supervised Data Diagnostics for ML Pipelines
we search for the nearest neighbors of a sample, we use dif-
ferent distances for the three types of attributes. For numer-
ical attributes, the distance is d/0.05 if d ≤ 0.05, where d is
the difference between two normalized values; the distance
is 1 if d > 0.05. For categorical attributes, the distance is
1 if two values are different, and 0 otherwise. For textual
attributes, we use the cosine distance. We set k to 10.
We consider two methods of adversarial sample detection:
• The Odds are Odd (TOAO) TOAO [45] assumes that ad-
versarial samples are more sensitive to random noise than
benign samples, i.e., it is more likely that adding random
noise to an adversarial sample changes the prediction. It de-
tects adversarial samples based on the change in the distri-
bution of the logit values after the injection of random noise.
It adds Gaussian, Bernoulli, and Uniform noise of different
magnitude and takes the majority vote of all noise sources.
• Model with Outlier Class (MWOC)MWOC [21] assumes
that the feature distribution of adversarial samples is differ-
ent from that of benign samples. Therefore, it adds a new
outlier class to the downstream model to characterize the
distribution of adversarial samples.
Metrics For training set outlier detection, we report the area un-
der the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC). We use
AUROC since we want to compare the performance of outlier de-
tection in various threshold settings. AUROC is a measure of the
accuracy of a diagnostic test. Typical AUROC values range from
0.5 (no diagnostic ability, i.e., random guess) to 1.0 (perfect diag-
nostic ability). Intuitively, the AUROC is the probability that the
criterion value of a sample drawn at random from the population
of thosewith a target condition (in our case the sample is an outlier)
is larger than the criterion value of another sample drawn at ran-
dom from the populationwhere the target condition is not met. An
AUROC greater than 0.8 is considered excellent for detection [24].
We also consider the test accuracy of downstream models.
For victim sample detection at test time, we report the F1 scores
of the classification between correctly classified samples and vic-
tim samples. F1 score is a good fit since most of the victim sample
methods are based on classifiers and there is no explicit threshold.
All experiments are repeated five times with different random
seeds that control train-test split and noise injection, and themeans
of the five runs are reported.
Hyper-parameters of PicketNet PicketNet is not sensitive to
hyper-parameters in most cases. The default hyper-parameters we
use in the experiments is shown in Table 2. For purely numeri-
cal datasets, we reduce the dimension of I (l )i and P
(l )
i to 8, and for
HTRU2, we reduce the number of self-attention layers to 1. In the
other datasets, we always use the default hyper-parameters. We
use the Adam optimizer [29] with β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.98 and ϵ = 10−9
for training. The learning rate lr = 0.5d−0.5min(s−0.5, 300−1.5s),
where d is the dimension of I (l )i and P
(l )
i , s is the index of the train-
ing step. lr increases in the first few steps and then decreases. Typ-
ically, PicketNet takes 100 to 500 epochs to converge, depending
on the datasets.
Table 2: Default hyper-parameters for PicketNet.
Hyper-Parameter Value
Number of Self-Attention Layers 6
Number of Attention Heads 2
Dimension of I (l )
i
and P (l )
i
64
Number of Hidden Layers in Each Feedforward Network 1
Dimension of the Hidden Layers in Each Feedforward Network 64
Dropout 0.1
Size of the Negative Sample Set Zi 4
Warm-up Epochs E1 for Loss-Based Filtering 50
Loss Recording Epochs E2 20
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Figure 4: AUROC of outlier detection for random noise.
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Figure 5: AUROC of outlier detection for systematic noise.
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Figure 6: AUROC of outlier detection for adversarial noise.
6.2 Training Time Diagnostics Evaluation
We first evaluate the performance of different methods on detect-
ing erroneous points in the training data, without considering a
downstream model. This setup is similar to that of error detection.
We then focus on training time diagnostics and consider the effec-
tiveness of different methods at safeguarding against degradation
of downstream ML pipelines due to data corruptions.
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Table 3: Test accuracy of downstream models under adver-
sarial poisoning attacks and different filtering methods.
Dataset
Downstream
Model IF OCSVM RVAE Picket CL NF
Wine
LR 0.7261 0.6976 0.7051 0.7312 0.7349 0.6745
SVM 0.7286 0.6933 0.7082 0.7310 0.7386 0.6727
NN 0.7210 0.6894 0.7035 0.7320 0.7365 0.6722
HTRU2
LR 0.8884 0.9015 0.8811 0.9067 0.9396 0.8799
SVM 0.8884 0.8979 0.8887 0.9232 0.9424 0.8832
NN 0.8671 0.8707 0.8643 0.9000 0.9280 0.8646
Outlier Detection Performance We evaluate the performance
of Picket and the competingmethods on training time outlier detec-
tion. Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict the AUROC obtained by the meth-
ods for different noise settings. For the setting with random and
systematic noise, we corrupt 20% of the training set. We perform
the experiments for random and systematic noise on five data sets
with various types of attributes. For the setting with data poison-
ing attack, we add poisoned samples to the training set until the
fraction of them gets 20%. Due to data poisoning being limited to
numerical data, we only evaluate on two data sets.
Picket is the only approach that consistently achieves an
AUROC of more than 0.8 for all data sets and for all noise set-
tings. Other methods achieve comparable performance in some
settings but they are not consistent and in many cases their diag-
nostic power drops close to that of random. It is worth nothing
that our approach outperforms the others by over 0.4 AUROC on
Restaurant both in the settings with random and systematic noise.
These results are expected since Restaurant contains several tex-
tual attributes and we employ techniques from the field of natural
language processing to build our model. For data sets that do not
contain many textual attributes, IF and OCSVM work quite well in
the random noise setting, but their performance drops when the
noise is systematic. RVAE performs poorly for purely categorical
data and data that contain text. For the other data sets, it performs
well on randomnoise but still suffers in the case of systematic noise.
In the presence of poisoned data, we filter out samples with abnor-
mally low outlier scores for all the competing methods due to the
concentration property of the poisoned samples. IF performs well
on Wine but poorly on HTRU2, but OCSVM shows the opposite.
A possible reason is that the two data sets have different types of
structures, and the two methods are good at capturing only one of
them. RVAE shows poor performance for both datasets.
Effect on Downstream Models We also study the effect on the
downstream models if we filter noisy samples based on the detec-
tion of the methods. For each method, we filter 20% of the samples
with highest outlier scores, and train different downstream models
on the resulting feasible set. For each data set the test set is fixed
and contains only clean data. As reference points, we also include
the test accuracy when 1) the training data is clean without cor-
ruption (CL), and 2) the training data is corrupted but no filtering
(NF) is performed. These two reference baselines correspond to the
desired best-case and worst-case performance.
First, we consider the case of adversarial corruptions since this
type of noise corresponds to the worst-case for the downstream
trained model. We measure the test accuracy of the downstream
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Figure 7: Changes in test accuracy of a neural network when
filtering different fraction of the points; random noise.
models when poisoning data is injected into the training stage.
The results are shown in Table 3. If we compare CL with NF we
see an average drop of six accuracy points if corruptions are ig-
nored and no filtering is applied. We find that all methods reduce
the negative impact of the poisoned data and bring up the test
accuracy. Nevertheless that Picket outperforms all competing
baselines and yields test time accuracy improvements ofmore
than three points in some cases.We see that Picket is able to re-
cover most of the accuracy loss for all models in the Wine data
set and comes very close to CL for HRTU2. All other methods ex-
hibit smaller accuracy improvements and do not exhibit consistent
behavior across data.
We also consider the cases of randomand systematic noise. These
types of noise do not directly attack the downstream model. More-
over, most ML models are somewhat robust to these types of noise.
As a result, we expect to see a small gap in the test accuracy be-
tween CL and NF, and all methods to perform comparably. We
consider these setups for completeness.
We first focus on random noise. The results are shown in Ta-
bles 4. As expected, in the presence of random noise, the perfor-
mance of the downstream models drops in some cases and remains
roughly the same in the other cases if we look at CL and NF. In
the cases when the downstream accuracy drops, we can see that
filtering helps most of the time. To better understand the perfor-
mance of different methods, we consider the average changes of
accuracy compared to the two reference points across all data sets
and models. The aggregated result is shown in Table 5. Among all
the methods, our model has the most positive effect on the down-
stream accuracy since the improvement over doing nothing is the
largest, and the accuracy is closest to clean data. This is expected
since our method is the most powerful in detecting outliers.
If we compare the performance of Picket and NF in Table 4 for
Neural Networks, we see that for Adult, Titanic, and Restaurant
Picket exhibits slightlyworse test accuracy. These results are attrib-
uted to the selected thresholds for filtering in Picket (see Section 5).
In Figure 7, we show the test accuracy of the downstream neural
network for different levels of the Picket threshold.We can see that
for some datasets, random noise serves as regularization and im-
proves the performance of the downstream model. Therefore, we
need to tune the threshold to achieve the best performance.
We then turn our attention to systematic noise. The results are
shown in Table 6. We find that the corruption we inject does not
have much effect on the downstreammodel, therefore any filtering
is unnecessary and uninteresting in that case. All measurements
are within the margin of statistical error.
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Table 4: Test accuracy of downstreammodels under random
noise and different filtering methods.
Dataset
Downstream
Model IF OCSVM RVAE Picket CL NF
Wine
LR 0.7322 0.7314 0.7327 0.7337 0.7349 0.6806
SVM 0.7347 0.7349 0.7322 0.7359 0.7386 0.6647
NN 0.7892 0.7943 0.7914 0.7808 0.8027 0.7808
Adult
LR 0.8096 0.8224 0.8138 0.8221 0.8242 0.8031
SVM 0.7920 0.8129 0.7970 0.8092 0.8180 0.7885
NN 0.7800 0.7764 0.7749 0.7742 0.7945 0.7879
Restaurant
LR 0.7294 0.7308 0.7341 0.7371 0.7396 0.7391
SVM 0.7329 0.7332 0.7311 0.7372 0.7369 0.7375
NN 0.7142 0.7107 0.7101 0.7175 0.7314 0.7213
Marketing
LR 0.7718 0.7754 0.7751 0.7759 0.7777 0.7765
SVM 0.7702 0.7669 0.7771 0.7645 0.7779 0.7773
NN 0.7268 0.7341 0.7337 0.7331 0.7336 0.7315
Titanic
LR 0.7855 0.7832 0.7788 0.7844 0.7855 0.7721
SVM 0.8112 0.8056 0.8078 0.8112 0.8156 0.8045
NN 0.7464 0.7486 0.7542 0.7542 0.7922 0.7654
Table 5: Average test time accuracy change after filtering
with different methods against CL and NF for randomnoise.
Reference Point IF OCSVM RVAE Picket
CL -0.0118 -0.0095 -0.0106 -0.0088
NF 0.0063 0.0087 0.0075 0.0093
Table 6: Test accuracy of downstream models under system-
atic noise and different filtering methods.
Dataset
Downstream
Model
IF OCSVM RVAE Picket CL NF
Wine
LR 0.7353 0.7337 0.7378 0.7351 0.7349 0.7365
SVM 0.7331 0.7324 0.7359 0.7306 0.7386 0.7345
NN 0.7918 0.7802 0.7816 0.7882 0.8029 0.7933
Adult
LR 0.8211 0.8148 0.8219 0.8200 0.8242 0.8204
SVM 0.8106 0.8092 0.8141 0.8103 0.8180 0.8119
NN 0.7760 0.7736 0.7755 0.7761 0.7880 0.7775
Restaurant
LR 0.7333 0.7351 0.7333 0.7337 0.7396 0.7377
SVM 0.7355 0.7324 0.7344 0.7344 0.7369 0.7402
NN 0.7200 0.7169 0.7102 0.7161 0.7239 0.7267
Marketing
LR 0.7721 0.7718 0.7722 0.7739 0.7777 0.7755
SVM 0.7568 0.7584 0.7703 0.7598 0.7779 0.7709
NN 0.7347 0.7420 0.7392 0.7337 0.7396 0.7316
Titanic
LR 0.7821 0.7754 0.7866 0.7899 0.7855 0.7788
SVM 0.8067 0.8067 0.8101 0.8112 0.8156 0.8112
NN 0.7844 0.7676 0.7777 0.7665 0.7832 0.7832
6.3 Inference Time Diagnostics Evaluation
We compare Picket against the competing methods on victim sam-
ple detection under different types of noise at inference time. The
F1 scores under random, systematic and adversarial noise are re-
ported in Table 7, 8,and 9 respectively. The test set consists of vic-
tim samples and good samples that can be correctly classified by
the downstream model. The good samples can either be clean or
noisy. Victim samples account for 50%, and so do the good samples.
The task is to pick the victim samples from the test set. We provide
an augmented training set to all the methods. The augmented set
is generated based on a clean training set. It has the same compo-
nent as the test set but only with random noise, since we assume
that the types of systematic and adversarial noise are unknown
when the system is deployed. For the defense of adversarial noise,
Table 7: F1 scores of victim sample detection at inference
time under random noise.
Dataset DM* RF RVAE RVAE+ CCS KNN TOAO MWOC Picket
Wine
LR 0.7698 0.8159 0.8357 0.6666 0.6843 0.7322 0.7458 0.8307
SVM 0.7793 0.8227 0.8421 0.6665 0.6987 0.5494 0.7606 0.8271
NN 0.7088 0.7616 0.7843 0.5156 0.6662 0.3176 0.7970 0.7682
Adult
LR 0.8427 0.7110 0.8578 0.6634 0.7679 0.2895 0.6895 0.8636
SVM 0.8643 0.7247 0.8738 0.6650 0.8153 0.3991 0.7357 0.8769
NN 0.8234 0.6895 0.8417 0.4944 0.6861 0.2562 0.7895 0.8454
Restaurant
LR 0.7734 –# – 0.7514 0.6678 0.6071 0.7478 0.8266
SVM 0.7734 – – 0.7514 0.6678 0.5186 0.7478 0.8266
NN 0.7565 – – 0.7052 0.6600 0.6624 0.7042 0.8149
Marketing
LR 0.8486 0.6493 0.8502 0.7659 0.7593 0.6288 0.8216 0.8623
SVM 0.8491 0.6833 0.8536 0.7687 0.7866 0.6402 0.8245 0.8630
NN 0.7958 0.6397 0.8065 0.6706 0.7107 0.5266 0.7194 0.8183
Titanic
LR 0.8417 – – 0.6860 0.6584 0.6537 0.7922 0.8590
SVM 0.8389 – – 0.6431 0.6457 0.5533 0.7846 0.8482
NN 0.8298 – – 0.6619 0.6512 0.3306 0.7798 0.8391
*DM is short for DownstreamModel. #RVAE is not applicable to textual attributes.
Table 8: F1 scores of victim sample detection at inference
time under systematic noise.
Dataset DM* RF RVAE RVAE+ CCS KNN TOAO MWOC Picket
Wine
LR 0.7641 0.5971 0.7720 0.7634 0.6646 0.5360 0.7501 0.8025
SVM 0.7730 0.6011 0.7747 0.7703 0.6656 0.5629 0.7705 0.8001
NN 0.6686 0.5903 0.6643 0.6587 0.6643 0.6639 0.6803 0.7109
Adult
LR 0.8022 0.5827 0.7855 0.6669 0.7198 0.0077 0.7160 0.8086
SVM 0.8285 0.5759 0.8110 0.2339 0.7777 0.6667 0.7228 0.8306
NN 0.7886 0.4606 0.7798 0.5799 0.6821 0.1181 0.6558 0.7949
Restaurant
LR 0.7813 –# – 0.7623 0.6680 0.4819 0.7619 0.8234
SVM 0.7892 – – 0.7470 0.6702 0.6664 0.7762 0.8307
NN 0.7559 – – 0.7100 0.6602 0.6244 0.6919 0.7968
Marketing
LR 0.8553 0.6355 0.8600 0.7744 0.7617 0.6288 0.8336 0.8679
SVM 0.8499 0.7003 0.8564 0.7861 0.7877 0.6387 0.8323 0.8677
NN 0.7881 0.6080 0.7996 0.6792 0.7135 0.5322 0.6826 0.8077
Titanic
LR 0.8138 – – 0.7109 0.6491 0.3598 0.7741 0.8272
SVM 0.8518 – – 0.6281 0.6317 0.6367 0.8328 0.8495
NN 0.8099 – – 0.6668 0.6436 0.3202 0.6780 0.8176
*DM is short for DownstreamModel. #RVAE is not applicable to textual attributes.
Table 9: F1 scores of victim sample detection at inference
time under adversarial noise.
Dataset DM* RF RVAE RVAE+ CCS KNN TOAO MWOC Picket
Wine
LR 0.8282 0.6975 0.8314 0.8273 0.6621 0.6142 0.8089 0.8246
SVM 0.8344 0.6899 0.8372 0.8017 0.6655 0.6450 0.8164 0.8361
NN 0.7683 0.6795 0.7653 0.6083 0.6637 0.6679 0.6559 0.7763
HTRU2
LR 0.9250 0.6859 0.9238 0.8878 0.6660 0.6557 0.9148 0.9291
SVM 0.9626 0.7055 0.9622 0.8531 0.6643 0.6577 0.9275 0.9677
NN 0.9441 0.6854 0.9444 0.7417 0.6654 0.5387 0.9275 0.9543
*DM is short for Downstream Model.
we augment the datasets with low-magnitude random noise with
β = 1 and σ1 = 0.25 to match the noise level of the adversarial
noise. Some methods use the augmented training set to train their
models (RF, RVAE, RVAE+, MWOC, Picket), while the others use it
to find a good threshold (CCS, KNN, TOAO). RVAE is not applica-
ble to textual attributes in this stage since the lookup table it learns
from the training set cannot serve new data it has never seen.
From the tables, we can see that Picket has the best performance
in most cases. By comparing RF and our method, we show that the
reconstruction loss features provided by PicketNet are good
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Figure 8: Outlier detection under different stream settings.
signals to help identify victim samples. Such signals are bet-
ter than those provided by RVAE since our method outperforms
RVAE+most of the time. TOAO performs consistently poorly since
the assumption it relies on does not hold for the downstream mod-
els and data sets we consider. It works for image classification with
complex convolutional neural networks under adversarial settings
since adding random noise to images could eliminate the effect of
adversarial noise. However, for tabular data sets and models which
are not that complex, especially when the noise is not adversar-
ial, adding random noise does not make a big difference. Another
method from the adversarial learning literature (MWOC) works
well in some cases even if the noise is not adversarial.
6.4 Micro-Benchmarks
Effectiveness of the Two-Stream Self-Attention We perform
an ablation study to validate the effectiveness of the two-stream
self-attention. We evaluate the performance of outlier detection
with only one stream and with both. The results are depicted in
Figure 8. In the case of one stream, we simply let the output of self-
attention layer l be either H (l )i for the value stream, orG
(l )
i for the
schema stream instead of H (l )i + G
(l )
i , where i is the index of the
attribute. We use three setups: Wine with adversarial noise, Adult
with systematic noise, and Marketing with random noise.
From Figure 8, we see that for Adult and Marketing, PicketNet
with two streams outperforms both one-stream options. For Wine,
the value stream itself works fine, but a combination of the two
streams does not impair the performance of the model. Neither
of the two one-stream options demonstrates obvious superiority
over the other one, since there are cases that the value stream per-
forms better than the schema stream, and cases that the opposite
happens.
Effectiveness of the Early Filtering Mechanism We validate
the effectiveness of early filtering by comparing the performance
of outlier detection at the early stage of PicketNet’s training to that
after convergence. The results are shown in Figure 9. We use the
setup from the previous micro-benchmark.
Figure 9 shows that filtering at early stages consistently outper-
forms filtering after convergence. The reason is that in the early
stage of training, the model is less likely to overfit to the input, and
therefore the reconstruction loss of the outliers differs from that of
the clean samples more. However, the gaps between early and late
filtering are not excessively large, which indicates that PicketNet
is actually robust and tends not to overfit in the presence of noise.
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Figure 9: Early vs. after-convergence filtering.
Table 10: A comparison between the per-class detectors, the
unified detector, and the score-based detector on inference
time victim sample detection.
Dataset
Downstream
Model
Per-Class
Detectors
Unified
Detector
Score-based
Detector
Wine
LR 0.8195 0.7473 0.6938
SVM 0.8366 0.7787 0.7160
NN 0.7777 0.5687 0.6771
Adult
LR 0.8637 0.7362 0.7666
SVM 0.8765 0.7428 0.7703
NN 0.8455 0.7196 0.7511
Marketing
LR 0.8681 0.7640 0.7197
SVM 0.8685 0.7797 0.7287
NN 0.8073 0.7076 0.7007
Effectiveness of Per-Class Victim Sample Detectors We com-
pare the performance of our per-class detectors against a unified
detector and a score-based detector. The unified detector uses one
single logistic regression model over the same features to distin-
guish between good and victim samples regardless of the down-
stream predictions. The score-based detector follows the logic of
the training time outlier detector, i.e., it aggregates the reconstruc-
tion losses attribute-wise, and considers samples with high loss as
victims. We perform the comparison on three datasets with all of
the three downstream models: Wine with adversarial noise, Adult
with systematic noise and Marketing with random noise.
The result is shown in Table 10. Per-Class Detectors outperform
the other two, which validates the effectiveness of having one de-
tector per-class. The unified detector performs poorly because the
victim samples in one class differ from those in the other statisti-
cally. The score-based detector does not workwell since it only has
access to the noise level of the samples but does not consider the
connection between corruptions and the downstream prediction.
Runtime and Scalability We report the training time of Picket-
Net for each dataset in Table 11. The device we use is NVIDIA Tesla
V100-PCIE with 32GB memory. Note that the current runtime has
not been fully optimized.
We also study the attribute-wise scalibilty of PicketNet using
synthetic datasets. The datasets have a different number of attributes
ranging from 2 to 20with a increase step of one, while the other set-
tings are the same (the dimension of I (l )i and P
(l )
i is fixed to 8). We
report the training time of 100 epochs in Figure 10. The growth
of the runtime is roughly quadratic as the number of attributes
increases. This is expected since the dependencies between one
attribute and all the others yield quadratic complexity. When the
Picket: Self-supervised Data Diagnostics for ML Pipelines
Table 11: Training time of PicketNet for each dataset.
Dataset Wine Adult Restaurant Marketing Titanic HTRU2
Training Time (sec) 1953 8256 3794 4581 1693 189
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Figure 10: Attribute-wise scalibility of PicketNet
number of attributes is excessively large, we can apply simplemeth-
ods like computing the correlations between attributes to split the
attributes into groups, where only the attributes within the same
group exhibit correlations. Then, we can apply PicketNet to learn
the structure for each of the groups.
7 RELATED WORK
Data Validation Systems for ML TFX [3, 7] and Deequ [47] pro-
pose data validation modules that rely on user-defined constraints
and simple anomaly detection. CleanML [31] studies how the qual-
ity of training data affects the performance of downstream models.
These works focus on simple constraints such as data types, value
ranges, and one-column statistics and ignore the structure of the
data. NaCL [28] and CPClean [27] propose algorithms to deal with
missing entries, and the effect of missing entries are analyzed the-
oretically in [33]. These works are orthogonal to ours since they
only consider missing entries.
Learning Dependencies with Attention Mechanisms Atten-
tion mechanisms have been widely used in the field of natural lan-
guage processing to learn the dependencies between tokens [52,
57]. Recently, we introducedAimNet [53],which demonstrates that
attention mechanisms are also effective in learning the dependen-
cies between attributes in structured tabular data. AimNet employs
the attention techniques to impute the missing values in tabular
data and achieve state-of-the-art performance. AimNet is rather
simplistic and it only captures schema-level dependencies. Further-
more, training AimNet requires access to clean training data and
does not employ any robust-training mechanism to tolerate noise.
Outlier Detection Methods Outlier detection for tabular data
has been studied for years, and many rule-based methods have
been proposed [19, 26, 44]. Learning-based outlier detection has
become popular recently and focuses on semi-supervised or unsu-
pervised approaches. Semi-supervised methods such as the ones
proposed in [23, 37, 55] still need human in the loop to explicitly
label some data. Isolation Forest [32] and One-Class SVM [9] are
simple unsupervised methods that are widely used. Autoencoder-
based outlier detectionmethods [1, 17, 46] are most relevant to our
work since they also rely on the reconstruction of the input, and
among them RVAE [17] works best for mixed-type tabular data.
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses Training time attacks [4, 30,
39] add poisoned samples to corrupt the target model. Filtering-
based defenses [14, 50] remove suspicious samples during train-
ing based on training statistics. Inference time attacks [8, 35, 38]
add small perturbation to test samples to fool the classifier. Ef-
forts have been made to improve the robustness of the model by
training data augmentation [20, 36] or making modifications to the
model [41, 42, 54]. Another group of defenses trying to detect ad-
versarial samples at inference time are more directly related to our
work. Roth et al. [45] and Hu et al. [25] add random noise to in-
put samples and detect suspicious ones based on the changes in
the logit values. Grosse et al. [21] assume that adversarial samples
have different distributions from benign samples and add another
class to the downstream classifier to detect them.
8 CONCLUSION
We introduced Picket, a first-of-its-kind system that enables data
diagnostics for machine learning pipelines over tabular data. We
showed that Picket can safeguard against data corruptions that
lead to degradation either during training or deployment. To de-
sign Picket, we introduced PicketNet, a novel self-supervised deep
learning model that corresponds to a Transformer network for tab-
ular data. Picket is designed as a plugin that can increase the ro-
bustness of any machine learning pipeline.
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